The clean energy transition drives soaring demand for critical metals. In a review in this issue of One Earth, Vakulchuk and Overland show the vital role Central Asia could have in mineral supply and geopolitics. Here, I extend the scope to an emerging mining hotspot, Greenland in the Arctic, and discuss broader implications. The clean energy transition drives soaring demand for critical metals. In a review in this issue of One Earth, Vakulchuk and Overland show the vital role Central Asia could have in mineral supply and geopolitics. Here, I extend the scope to an emerging mining hotspot, Greenland in the Arctic, and discuss broader implications. The world’s future energy needs will depend increasingly on the mining of critical minerals necessary for the technologies and innovations that will drive efforts for decarbonization and electrification. This is given impetus by the 2015 Paris Agreement. Rare earth elements, for example, are required in the manufacture of the permanent magnets used in wind turbines as well as the components for solar panels and hybrid and electric vehicles.1Alves Dias P. Bobba S. Carrara S. Plazzotta B. The Role of Rare Earth Elements in Wind Energy and Electric Mobility. Joint Research Centre, 2020Google Scholar A World Bank study published in 2020 suggests that the demand for component minerals for the production of energy storage batteries alone, such as aluminum, cobalt, lithium, manganese, and nickel, could rise by more than 450% by 2050.2Hund K. La Porta D. Fabregas T.P. Laing T. Drexhage J. Minerals for Climate Action: The mineral intensity of the clean energy transition. World Bank Group, 2020Google Scholar However, a recent special report by the International Energy Authority3IEAThe Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions. IEA, 2021Google Scholar identified a number of risks associated with the mining and global supply of key minerals and metals that could slow progress toward a cleaner energy future. Many minerals come from a small number of producers operating in only a few countries. For example, in the cases of lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, the world’s top three producers—China, the United States, and Myanmar—control more than three-quarters of global output. China, however, is by far the major producer and exporter of rare earths and is also dominant in the production of other minerals defined as critical.4Kalantzakos S. China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths. Oxford University Press, 2018Google Scholar Ensuring access to those critical raw materials necessary for high-technology applications, including developing renewable energy projects and meeting the challenge of climate change, but also for the manufacturing of consumer electronics, has become an urgent environmental and economic matter. It is also a geopolitical and strategic issue.5Nakano J. The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021Google Scholar As Klinger illustrates, in response to China’s near dominance of the global production of rare earths, campaigns have been launched “to mine rare earths in the most forbidding of frontiers: in ecologically sensitive indigenous lands in the Amazon, in war-torn Afghanistan, in protected areas of Greenland, in the depths of the world’s oceans, and even on the Moon.”6Klinger J.M. Rare Earth Frontiers: From terrestrial subsoils to lunar landscapes. Cornell University Press, 2017Crossref Google Scholar In this issue of One Earth, Vakulchuk and Overland7Vakulchuk R. Overland I. Central Asia is a missing link in analyses of critical materials for clean energy transition.One Earth. 2021; 4: 1678-1692Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (4) Google Scholar assess the possibilities for the emergence of Central Asia as a region that could play a major role in the global supply of critical minerals. In reviewing the mineral resource base of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the authors show that these Central Asian states have often been overlooked in global resource assessments of critical materials for clean energy technologies, even though they were key suppliers of metals and industrial minerals for the Soviet Union. They argue, however, that the global shift in resource extraction from fossil fuels to critical minerals is not only bringing new interest from industry to Central Asia: it is moving the region’s geopolitical importance into sharper focus. The authors also point out that the international attention now being given to the region’s geological resources demands greater understanding of the role that Central Asia plays in China’s strategic positioning and its policy of heavy investment in mineral resource extraction there. However, China is a major player not just in the production of critical minerals. As Khanna puts it, Beijing “views the world almost entirely through the lens of supply chains.”8Khanna P. Connectography: Mapping the future of global civilization. Random House, 2016Google Scholar It is not, he argues, China’s intention to occupy countries militarily or to seek influence in domestic politics but to secure access to resources, enabling it greater influence in facilitating the smooth flow of global supplies. One of the main ways to do this is through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with investments in roads, harbors, and maritime transport. A major element of China’s BRI is a Polar Silk Road, which was outlined in a white paper on Arctic policy in 2018 that envisions greater investment in northern development and Arctic infrastructure. But it is not only China that is looking to the world’s high latitudes. As with the four Central Asian states, there is growing global interest in the resources of the Arctic. In particular, international attention is being given to Greenland’s potential for supplying critical minerals. A self-governing territory of the Kingdom of Denmark with ambitions for political independence, Greenland is often featured in scientific and media reports about global warming, as well as plans to exploit the resource potential of Arctic subsurface environments. While China has expressed interest in funding Greenlandic projects, the United States and other countries are positioning themselves to take advantage of Greenland’s resource potential, rare earth elements, markets, and geostrategic location. This was underscored in December 2020 when Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a report called “Greenland and Iceland in the New Arctic” in which business and investment opportunities, as well as other areas of cooperation, were identified as emerging from these changing environmental and geopolitical circumstances. The report, which was based on recommendations by a Greenland Committee appointed by the ministry, was widely publicized and garnered significant interest. In particular, the report points to the opportunities for developing a mining industry and states that “A major supply of rare earth metals have put Greenland in a new and unique position. Several overlapping factors indicate that the 21st century will be prosperous for the Greenlandic mining industry.”9Government of IcelandGreenland and Iceland in the New Arctic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020Google Scholar One of the first moves by the new government formed in Greenland after a general election in April 2021—a coalition of the Inuit Ataqatigiit and Naleraq parties—was to announce that it would ban the mining of uranium and other radioactive minerals. Three months later, in July, the government announced that it was suspending the granting of new licenses for oil exploration, explaining that Greenland was committed to developing strategies for renewable energy, promoting hydropower projects, and contributing to efforts to tackle global climate change. Greenland’s premier, Múte B. Egede, emphasized this was the path forward at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP26 meeting in Glasgow in November, when he declared that Greenland would join the 2015 Paris Agreement and that the country had ambition to emerge as an internationally recognized leader in green energy. At COP26, Greenland also joined ten other national or subnational governments to form the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, which is committed to delivering a transition away from oil and gas production. Although uranium extraction and oil exploration no longer appear to be promising areas for hopeful investors in Greenland’s resource sector, the subsurface nonetheless remains at the heart of much of Greenland’s domestic politics and discourses on political and economic independence. Mining companies with interests in other projects in Greenland—especially critical minerals—have been reassured that the country is still open for business and welcomes bids for prospecting and exploration licenses. For example, in September 2021, the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland carried out a seabed survey commissioned by De Beers off Greenland’s west coast near Maniitsoq as a first phase in determining the presence of marine diamond deposits. Greenlandic politicians and representatives of government agencies responsible for regulating extractive projects globetrot each year to Europe, North America, China, and Australia, marketing the country as attractive for (and welcoming of) mining companies, while China and other Asian countries are viewed as key markets for fish exports (a Greenlandic representation opened in Beijing in November 2021). The new government’s affirmation of Greenland’s commitment to developing a mining industry was underscored when, also in July 2021, Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC)-Greenland joined the Arctic Economic Forum (AEC) separately from its parent organization, the ICC (which was one of the founding members of the AEC in 2014), with the intent to promote Greenland’s pro-mining stance and to argue that mineral extraction, along with tourism, was essential for diversifying the economy. Greenland’s move to accede to the Paris Agreement as a signatory in its own right means that it does not wish to be bound by Denmark’s commitments to the treaty, especially as restrictions on CO2 emissions would hinder the development of mines. In July 2021, Greenland joined the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA), which was launched in September 2020 as part of a European Commission Action Plan, which aims to reduce Europe’s dependency on third party countries for its raw materials as it moves toward being carbon-neutral by 2050. In particular, relying exclusively on China is not a preferred option, a view expressed at the ERMA’s launch.10European CommissionERMA Launch.https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/erma-launch-european-raw-materials-allianceDate: 2020Google Scholar The European Union has identified Greenland as a major supplier for most of the critical minerals it needs, including its rare earths. And just as Vakulchuck and Overland point out that China’s influence in the critical minerals sector in Central Asia is of serious concern to US security considerations, the United States has been deeply concerned about potential Chinese influence in Greenland. American interest in Greenland has extended recently with the signing of agreements that set out a framework for cooperation on mineral sector governance, technical engagement, and capacity-building, as well as with the opening of a consulate in Nuuk. The environmental and social impacts of extracting critical minerals raise serious questions around the ethics and inequities of the path to a global energy transition.11Heffron R.J. The role of justice in developing critical minerals.Extr. Ind. Soc. 2020; 7: 855-863PubMed Google Scholar While it has become a stated aim of recent Greenlandic governments to “extract” revenue from mining activities and energy and industrial development, official plans have provoked highly charged political and social debates within Greenland about the nature and desirability of such a development and how it may redefine the nature of place as more and more areas in the country are marked off as resource zones. At the same time, contested perceptions and understandings of the environment have become increasingly apparent with concerns expressed by grassroots organizations, as well as international environmental and conservation groups, about threats to community viability, wildlife, and biodiversity. This is particularly pertinent given the fragile nature of the environment in the Arctic and its vulnerability to climate change. All of this has social, cultural, political, and environmental implications within Greenland, as well as being significant for relations within the Kingdom of Denmark, and for Greenland’s place in the world.12Nuttall M. Climate, society and subsurface politics in Greenland: Under the great ice. Routledge, 2017Crossref Scopus (21) Google Scholar Central Asia is a missing link in analyses of critical materials for the global clean energy transitionVakulchuk et al.One EarthDecember 17, 2021In BriefDemand for critical materials that are vital to clean energy technologies is on the rise. Although Central Asia is abundant in mineral resources, the role of this region in global critical mineral supply has been neglected. In this review we show that Central Asia could have an important role to play in future global mineral economics and geopolitics. Full-Text PDF Open Access